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OR TAKE A KNEE” LEGISLATION
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Academic reform has been an ongoing effort by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) since its inception. One of the recurring
challenges it has faced has been the setting of employable and achievable
academic standards for all athletes seeking to compete at one of its member
institutions, whether at the Division I, II, or III level. The primary goals have
been to establish academic standards and to inform and reaffirm the NCAA’s
commitment to academic excellence. Also of concern with setting these
academic standards is the need to quiet the critics who question whether
athletes are academically prepared to enter these institutions and thus, receive a
quality education—especially at the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision
(FBS) level. There have been several efforts to establish academic standards
that preceded the current “2.3 or Take a Knee” policy.1
Historically, the NCAA has implemented many reforms to reaffirm its
commitment to education including the following:



A 1.600 rule for initial academic eligibility in 1965;2
The abolition of the 1.600 legislation in 1973;3
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**** Major Professor & Advisor, Sport Management and Policy Department of Kinesiology,
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1.2.3 or Take a Knee, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/static/2point3/ (last visited June 9, 2016).
“2.3 or Take a Knee” is the colloquial phrase used to summarize the new Division I initial eligibility
requirements for perspective student-athletes.
2. JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 87 (2006).
3. Id. at 96.
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The reorganization of the NCAA into three divisions in
1973;4
In 1983, Proposition 48 required prospective
student-athletes to reach specified grade-point
averages and standardized test scores;5
In 1989, Proposition 42 withheld athletically-related
aid from partial academic qualifiers;6
The rescinding of Proposition 42 in 1990;7
In
1992,
Proposition
16
established
an
initial-eligibility index based on standardized test
scores and grade-point averages;8
In 2003, the number of core courses increased from
thirteen to fourteen, the partial qualifier was
abolished, and the minimum standardized test score
requirement was deleted;9
Finally in 2005, the Academic Progress Rate (APR)
subjected teams that fail to meet established minimum
scores to possible penalties ranging from loss of
scholarships to postseason bans and membership
restrictions.10

These are some of the major efforts that have been implemented by the
NCAA to increase academic standards among athletes and potentially ensure
success in their academic careers from matriculation to graduation.
With the increased migration of black athletes from Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) to Historically White Colleges and
Universities (HWCUs) during the late 1970s and early 1980s, academic
standards employed during and since that time have specifically had an
adverse impact on the enrollment of black male athletes participating in the

4. Id. at 117.
5. Id. at 161.
6. Id. at 184.
7. Id. at 189.
8. Id. at 192.
9. Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, NCAA Division I Strengthens Academic Eligibility Standards,
COLLEGIATE SPORTS GRP. NEWSLETTER 1–2 (Oct. 2002), http://www.bsk.com/site/files/10-2002%
20NL%20Collegiate%20Sports.pdf.
10. CROWLEY, supra note 2, at 228.
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revenue-generating sports of men’s basketball and football.11 For the
upcoming implementation of the new initial-eligibility standard, referred to as
2.3 or Take a Knee,12 the NCAA must consider the policy’s potential for
reigniting and reaffirming institutional racist practices in the organization’s
attempts to combat academic criticism. A review of its history exposes how
many of its choices, while supposedly appeasing opponents of the
organization’s alleged commitment to athletics over academics, result in the
disproportionate alienation of African-Americans from higher education
opportunities. Thus, the potential impact of this new policy calls into question
the NCAA’s racial integrity towards the population that makes up the largest
percentage of revenue-generating sports. To prevent institutional racist
practices, the NCAA should work with its members to provide equitable
eligibility opportunities for all student-athletes, but particularly for the
African-American students participating in men’s basketball and football, who
have historically been affected the most, and if implications hold true, will see
their potential to contribute to college athletics drop steeply by the fall
semester of 2016.
II.

A NEW NCAA DIVISION I ELIGIBILITY STANDARD

For the 2016 incoming class of student-athletes, NCAA initial
eligibility standards have once again tightened. A freshman athlete must enter
with a minimum 2.3 high school core GPA and a corresponding standardized
test score of 900 on the math and reading sections of the SAT, or a 75
combined score on the English, math, science, and reading sections of the ACT,
to be immediately eligible for competition; the previous standard, which
required a minimum core GPA of 2.0 and a 1010 on the SAT (or 86 on the
ACT), will result in an academic redshirt year,13 allowing the student-athlete to
receive athletic aid and practice with the team during the first academic term. 14
11. See generally id. Though college athletics as a whole has grown in popularity, only Division I
basketball and football continuously generate revenue in the multimillion-dollar range. The bulk of the
revenue comes from schools participating in five FBS conferences: SEC, ACC, Pac-12, Big Ten, and
Big 12. Though universities outside of these conferences generate massive revenue as well,
specifically the football and basketball teams in the AAC and the basketball teams in the Big East
Conference, the majority of the revenue sports teams in these conferences are populated by
African-American athletes, many admitted through special admissions.
12. 2.3 or Take a Knee, supra note 1.
13. See Test Scores, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/test-scores (last
visited June 9, 2016).
14. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, New Eligibility Standards Start in 2016, NCAA.COM,
http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-04-26/new-eligibility-standards-start-2016 (last updated
Apr. 26, 2012) (providing a detailed account of the new academic requirements for prospective
college student-athletes seeking admission beginning in Fall 2016). A 2.0 GPA in core courses will
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A student-athlete on probation can earn additional practice time for the next
term by passing nine semester hours, or eight quarter hours.15 Additional
changes include the need for ten of sixteen core courses to be completed
before the start of a prospective student-athlete’s senior year of high school,
seven of which must be in English, math, and science; otherwise, automatic
competition eligibility will be revoked.16 According to the NCAA, the
intention is to ensure that prospective athletes are just as prepared for school as
they are for their sport, and it suggests that the initial impact of the initiative
will decrease with time as incoming students adjust.17 However, NCAA
research shows that men’s basketball and football players will feel the most
significant immediate impact.18 Had these new requirements gone into effect
during the 2010–2011 academic year (just prior to its announcement), 41% of
men’s basketball and 35% of football incoming players would have been
deemed ineligible to compete.19 What is disconcerting is how this will likely
disproportionately impact the African-American population of the incoming
class in revenue sports. Of all Division I men’s basketball and football players,
African-Americans make 60.9% and 46.8% of the populations, respectively.20
However, this is not surprising to critics who point to a long-implied covert, and
even overt, history of racism inherent in the development of HWCUs (also
referred to as predominantly white institutions (PWIs)) and the NCAA’s
handling of academic policies that largely concern its African-American
athletes.

still grant a scholarship but will bar the athlete from immediate athletic participation. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. NCAA DIVISION I INITIAL-ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS, SUPP. NO. 20, 4–5,
http://www3.nd.edu/~ncaacomp/documents/IEExecutiveSummary.pdf (last visited June 9, 2016).
Much has been written about how, with each new academic standard, a large percentage of
student-athletes from previous years would have been deemed ineligible. The stated percentages are
the predictions, based on available data, for the negative impact the new standards will have on the
incoming 2016 class.
20. Albert Y. Bimper Jr., Game Changers: The Role Athletic Identity and Racial Identity Play on
Academic Performance, 55 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 795, 795 (2014). African-Americans make up the
largest percentage of men’s basketball teams, and a large percentage of football teams, at some of the
nation’s most prestigious universities, private and public, though they only make up single-digit
percentages at most of these same institutions as a whole.

HAWKINS ET AL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

6/14/2016 5:33 PM

INSTITUTI ONAL RACISM IN THE NCAA

527

III. NCAA POLICIES: A TROUBLED HISTORY
A. Exclusion and Overt Discrimination
Beginning in 1852, college athletics have been a vital part of the
postsecondary education experience;21 however, so has racial discrimination
and prejudice.22 Throughout the late 1800s and into the 1900s, legal
segregation limited African-American participation at the most prominent
colleges in the nation.23 Though a few were afforded playing opportunities at
PWIs in the North, the Southern PWIs barred them from entry and
participation.24 Statutes existed prohibiting athletic competition between black
and white athletes, relegating African-Americans to playing in less formally
organized settings.25 In some universities, even if African-Americans were
admitted, the African-American students were still barred from athletic
participation.26 In Northern schools, black athletes often had to sit out during
games against Southern institutions.27 Additionally, many Northern
institutions adopted quotas to limit the number of black athletes on a team, and

21. See Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College
Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 623 (1995). College athletics predates the NCAA. See
generally id. The organization was created as a unifying body that allowed voluntary membership. The
first established and recorded intercollegiate competition was a crew match between Harvard and Yale.
Id. at 623 n.33.
22. See id. Racial discrimination in intercollegiate sport is interlinked with the discrimination
African-Americans receive as part of America’s historical and social context, not independent. See id.
23. Id. at 624. The Jim Crow laws established the “separate but equal” regulations that segregated
white and black interaction in almost all realms, including most academic institutions.
24. See id. at 626. In general, African-Americans were prohibited from athletic participation at
Catholic universities; they also could not participate in sports at schools that did not admit black
students. Id.
25. See id. at 625–26. The University of Kansas limited African-Americans’ rights to most
extracurricular activities, including the universities’ athletic teams, with the athletic director stating that
no person of color would play on a team while he was in charge. Id. at 626–27.
26. See id. at 626. “[B]lacks were denied practically every right except that of attending classes.”
Id. at 627 (quoting RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE NEW NEGRO ON CAMPUS: BLACK COLLEGE
REBELLIONS OF THE 1920S 316 (1975)).
27. Id. at 628.
[M]ost northern teams with blacks on their rosters either did not schedule games
against southern teams or would leave their African-American players at home when
the team traveled south. It has also been suggested that a promise to withdraw
voluntarily from games against southern schools was an element of the consideration
that some northern institutions extracted from their black athletes.
Id.
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the only students allowed were expected to be “exceptionally talented.”28 Even
if they were allowed to partake in athletic participation, racism still ran
rampant.29 Sport participation was limited to track and field and similar sports
that did not require “intimate physical contact” with white athletes.30 Many
associate the social pariah status of the African-American college athlete with
their academic neglect and underperformance: they were advised to take courses
with little merit and focus on gaining and maintaining eligibility.31
B. Covert Practices? Academic Policy Beginnings: Props 48 and 42
College football and basketball were white men’s games from their
beginnings until the 1970s.32 And during the early years, academic policies were
light. “[I]n 1948 the NCAA instituted the ‘sanity code’” that ensured
academic integrity as one of its components; it was quickly eliminated in
1951.33 In 1959, the NCAA required twelve-credit semesters. As stated earlier,
1965 saw the introduction of a 1.6 minimum GPA for continued eligibility.
Prospective student-athletes required a high school GPA of 1.6 and an SAT or
ACT score that predicted at least a 1.6 GPA as a college freshman.34 This
policy remained in place for a decade. Until the 1970s, the NCAA did not
undergo any additional academic reforms. During these early years, most sports,
including men’s basketball and football, were dominated by white
athletes. However, as the African-American presence in college athletics
began to rise, there was a simultaneous decrease in academic standards and
increase in academic exploitation.35 In 1972, the 1.6 rule was abolished
leaving virtually no academic standards for incoming student-athletes, other

28. Id. at 629–30.
29. See generally id.
30. Id. at 631–32. “These sports were viewed as not involving the type of intimate physical contact
required by basketball and swimming.” Id. at 632.
31. See id. at 631–33. The isolation that African-Americans faced on college campuses caused not
only emotional pain but frustration that manifested in poor academic performance; institutions
focused on helping them maintain athletic eligibility at best. Id.
32. See Delgreco K. Wilson, Black Athletes, Race and the Rise of NCAA Eligibility Requirements,
THE BLACK CAGER (Sept. 18, 2014), http://delgrecowilson.com/2014/09/18/black-athletes-race-andthe-rise-of-ncaa-eligibility-requirements/. Because of Jim Crow segregation, most African-Americans
only participated in athletics at historically black institutions that lacked the organization and esteem
of their PWI counterparts.
33. Phillip C. Blackman, The NCAA’s Academic Performance Program: Academic Reform or
Academic Racism?, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 225, 230–31 (2008).
34. Michael J. Mondello & Amy M. Abernethy, An Historical Overview of Student-Athlete
Academic Eligibility and the Future Implications of Cureton v. NCAA, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
127, 128 (2000).
35. See id. at 128–29.
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than graduating from high school. A year later, the minimum initial eligibility
GPA was raised to 2.0. During the same time period, in 1974, freshmen were
granted eligibility to participate in the revenue-generating sports of men’s
basketball and football. As the popularity of college athletics continued to rise
with the addition of a new crop of players, the NCAA decided that a uniform
academic system was needed to reflect the academic standards of its member
institutions’ missions. The organization was determined to avoid the
reputation of allowing its athletes to be seen as less than serious students.36 The
NCAA wanted to place some of the academic burden on the institutions by
mainstreaming athletics into the schools’ educational missions;
administrators and faculty would have to share in the responsibility of
upholding policies.37 Together with university officials, the NCAA set forth its
first full-fledged reform for incoming freshmen academic guidelines.38
However, the NCAA’s position was not widely accepted.
Some critics believed that the need for heightened standards was
influenced by the influx of African-American athletes entering college
athletics. As the 1970s continued, African-Americans moved towards
becoming the majority in the revenue-producing sports of men’s basketball and
football; by the 1980s, they were dominant.39 Whether the NCAA
intended for its new standards to disproportionately affect African-Americans
negatively is a constant source of contention. But, as accumulated knowledge
and research made it clear that these policies would negatively impact
African-American athletes, the organization moved forward with
implementing requirements that threatened African-American sport
participation and postsecondary enrollment while maintaining that no racial
discrimination was intended.40
The problems began with Proposition 48, or Prop 48 for short.
Implemented in 1986, Prop 48 required an incoming GPA of 2.0 and an SAT
(reading and math) or ACT composite test score of 700 or 15, respectively, to
avoid an automatic year of ineligibility.41 Additionally, the 2.0 GPA minimum
36. Id. at 127. College athletics worked adamantly to avoid the “dumb jock” stereotype that was
developing with the growing popularity of college sports and the number of academic concessions
being made for the student-athletes. Id.
37. Id. at 129.
38. Id. at 130. Proposition 48 would see widespread backlash, especially from the
African-American community. Id. at 133.
39. See Wilson, supra note 32 (explaining dominant in the sense of making up the majority of the
teams at most institutions while only being a disproportionately small percentage of the general
student body).
40. See id. The NCAA held steadfast to its claim that whether or not African-Americans would be
harmed by its policies, any of these negatives were not intended by the new academic standards. Id.
41. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 131.
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had to be the result of a cumulative average from eleven core courses in high
school.42 The year prior to its introduction, between 40% and 60% of entering
student-athletes in the average Division I-A men’s basketball and football
programs scored less than 700 on the SAT.43 Consequently, over the next four
years, there was a drop in African-American participation as they tried to
adjust to the changes.44 Proponents argued that athletes would rise to the
occasion to meet the new standards or have a year to acclimate to college while
having more time to focus on problem courses.45 Opponents could not see
beyond the obvious: the new test score standards had the largest effect on the
black student-athletes, which eliminated a large percentage, 45%, of the
eligibility pool that could have graduated under the old standards.46 The NCAA
also had to face the criticism of the actual test makers. George
Hanford, the then-president of the College Board, stated that it was
indisputable that African-Americans performed worse on standardized tests
because of a lack of educational privilege and that using the SAT as a
minimum standard was racist and discriminatory.47 Additionally, the score
cutoff violated SAT science; the test has a 50-point standard deviation,
meaning that a 700 should be calculated the same as a score as low as 650.48
Hanford concluded by stating that the only purpose of the SAT is to be a
first-year college predictor and that the way the NCAA was using the
42. Blackman, supra note 33, at 231. GPAs were calculated using core courses to try to create
consistency nationwide; core course curriculums are much more standardized and can be monitored in
ways that electives cannot be.
43. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 131.
44. Id. at 131–32. The percentage of African-American student-athletes who met the new
qualifications was disproportionately less than their white counterparts.
45. Id. at 132. The NCAA believed that African-American student-athletes would eventually adjust
to the new standards and rates would normalize.
46. See id. at 133.
47. Id. at 134.
It is an undisputed fact that minority candidates earn significantly lower scores on the
average because many of them are less privileged educationally and
socio-economically than whites. Proposition 48 will have a differentially severe
impact on the aspiring athletes among blacks, but not because of bias in the SAT, but
because of the educational deficit that exists in this country. So, it is [quite] obvious
that the use of SATs to help set minimum academic standards for freshmen is patently
discriminatory and racist in its effects. Its use is a disservice to minority athletes.
HAROLD J. VANDERZWAAG, POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN SPORT MANAGEMENT 49 (2d ed. 1998);
Accord Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 134.
48. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 134. “A second problem with the use of the SAT
minimum test score was that the use of this standard violated the scientific and philosophical
principles upon which the SAT was based.” Id.
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assessment contradicted its purpose; it is meant to be one factor in the college
admissions process.49 More importantly, there was no empirical evidence for
the 700 absolute cutoff score.50
The College Board was not the only vocal opponent. Two coaches shared
their disdain for the new standards. Coach John Chaney of Temple University
accused the NCAA of racism, stating that the new rules punished
African-Americans.51 Coach John Thompson, Jr. of Georgetown University
called for the NCAA to review the effects of its policy and change the rules.52
During the same year, the organization began the revision process, but even with
the direct evidence and accusations of the discriminatory practices that resulted
from the implementation of Prop 48, the NCAA continued to raise its standards,
asserting that its only mission was to combat the “dumb jock” stereotype.53
In 1989, that revision became the short-lived Prop 42 and was
controversial from the start. It was written and sponsored by the Southeastern
Conference (SEC), the last major conference to open up its teams to black
athletes, which vowed implementation with or without NCAA adoption.54 Prop
42 created the partial qualifier: a student-athlete who met at least one of the
eligibility benchmarks—the 2.0 core GPA, the test score requirements, or the
completion of eleven core courses—could receive need-based, not
athletically-based, financial aid.55 A non-qualifier could not receive any aid

49. Id. at 134–35.
50. Id. at 135.
Critics of Proposition 48 cited evidence from a new study that showed there was no
statistical or educational rationale for using standardized test scores as an absolute
cutoff for eligibility. From the outset, advocates of African-American student-athletes
have argued that the tests were culturally biased, while testing-company officials have
insisted that their tests were never intended to serve as an absolute cutoff. Even many
of the rule's supporters acknowledge that the decision to set the eligibility cutoff at
700 was not based on empirical knowledge.
Id.
51. Wilson, supra note 32.
52. Id.
53. See Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 127, 135. Prior to Prop 48, the single condition
of needing to graduate from high school to be a college student-athlete did not help the negative
stereotypes cast on college athletics. Id. at 129.
54. Wilson, supra note 32.
55. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 135. Accord Blackman, supra note 33, at 231–32.
“[A] ‘partial qualifier’ . . . ‘may receive institutional financial aid that is not from an athletic source and
is based on financial need only, consistent with institutional and conference regulations . . . during the
first academic year . . . .’” Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 135 (quoting 1995–96 NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL art. 14.3.2.1.1 (1995)).
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during the first academic year.56 Ultimately, the NCAA reverted back to its
revision process. Its next reform, Prop 16, was introduced for the 1996–1997
academic year. Prop 16 would not only prove to be one of its most
controversial provisions but would also result in a lawsuit that publicly had
student-athletes accuse the organization of the racism that many believed it had
been operating under for years.
C. Implicit Racism? Prop 16 and Cureton v. NCAA
Prop 16 took Prop 48 and virtually raised all of its standard
requirements. The initial eligibility GPA increased from a 2.0 to a 2.5, and the
core course total increased from eleven to thirteen.57 It was also Division I’s
first introduction to the sliding scale that was to “make the initial eligibility
index more malleable.”58 The 2.5 GPA aligned with a 700 or 18 on the SAT or
ACT, respectively. If the student’s GPA was below this, the standardized test
score minimum adjusted accordingly. The lowest minimum GPA, a 2.0,
required a 1010 on the SAT or ACT sum of 86 to preserve athletic
eligibility.59 Meanwhile, with a 2.5 GPA, a student could compete with an 820
SAT or 68 ACT sum.60 As the GPA increased, the test score decreased and vice
versa.
Partial qualifiers were still allowed under this proposition. “[A]n SAT score
between 720 and 810 (ACT [sum] score between 59 and 67) and a core GPA
that produces a GPA-test combination score comparable to that required of
qualifiers” could grant a student athletic financial aid but bar athletic
participation.61 As expected, Prop 16 closed college doors for many
African-American student-athletes.62 The disproportion was obvious: while
only 46.4% of black high school seniors met the requirements, 67% of white
seniors were eligible. Now, with a number of direct incidents that markedly
affected black student-athletes, a few students decided it was time to seek
justice in court.
In 1997, four African-American student-athletes challenged the NCAA’s
56. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 135. (“[A] student-athlete who achieved neither the
GPA nor SAT/ACT benchmarks, ‘shall not be eligible for . . . institutional financial aid during the first
academic year.’” Id. (quoting 1995–96 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 14.3.2.2.1 (1995)).
57. Id. at 135–36.
58. Blackman, supra note 33, at 233.
59. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 136.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Blackman, supra note 33, at 233. “Despite this sliding scale, a study by The National Center
for Education Statistics indicated that Prop. 16 significantly reduced opportunities for all
student-athletes, particularly African-Americans.” Id.

HAWKINS ET AL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

6/14/2016 5:33 PM

INSTITUTI ONAL RACISM IN THE NCAA

533

minimum cutoff score with the primary question of whether
Proposition 16 violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 The
plaintiffs claimed that the use of a cutoff had “an unjustified, disparate impact
on African-American student-athletes.”64 The district court found for the
plaintiffs initially.65 There were three main components to address in the case:
(a) if the NCAA was subject to Title VI regulations, (b) if minimum test scores
created a disparate impact among minorities students, and (c) if Prop 16
justified an educational necessity.66 In response to the first component, the court
held that because the NCAA received federal funds, even if through
indirect means, it was subject to Title VI regulation because those funds were
used to sponsor a program.67 For the second part, the court held that even though
there was some “beneficial impact” to Prop 16 (i.e., the increased graduation
rates), that was not the argument here, and this benefit could not
overcompensate for the disproportionately large, negative impact affecting the
same group.68 The court concluded the case by responding to the third
argument: closing the graduation gap between white and black students was a
real educational concern, but this “back-end” benefit could not undo the
underlying effects of Prop 16 and its attempts to use a “bottom-line” defense to
justify its practices.69 This victory for the four student-athletes was
short-lived, however, as it was reversed in December 1999 in Cureton II.70 The
Third Circuit ruled that “section 601 of Title VI did not preclude
recipients of federal funds from [discriminatory practices against] programs not
63. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 139 (citing Cureton v. NCAA (Cureton I), 37 F. Supp.
2d 687, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, “No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, or be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964)
(prohibiting discrimination on basis of race by any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance).
Id. at 139, n.89.
64. Id. at 139–40 (citing Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 689).
65. Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
66. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 139–45.
67. Id. at 142; see also Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
68. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 144 (citing Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 700). “The
court, however, found the NCAA's argument unpersuasive, determining that a selection practice having
a disproportionate ‘beneficial’ impact upon a specific group could compensate for any disproportionate
adverse impact on that same group.” Id.
69. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 145 (citing Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 705).
70. Cureton v. NCAA (Cureton II), 198 F.3d 107, 118 (3d Cir. 1999).
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receiving the federal funding.”71 Although NCAA institutions receive
federal funds, the NCAA itself does not, and the NCAA does not actually
control its member institutions; members have the option to withdraw from the
organization if they do not want to accept any sanctions or follow its
policies.72
Though defeated, Cureton I is still an important legal matter in that it
opened the doors to athletes questioning the NCAA’s policies, especially the
black athletes who seemed to face more institutional racism with every new
NCAA policy.73 Coaches and athletes inquired into the creators of the rules.
They accused the NCAA of using its policies to appease racist university
administrators and supporters while pretending to be inclusive but actually
reducing the black presence in college athletics, and college in general.74
Opponents wondered whether rules were being created in a vacuum.75 Each
reform harmed more and more of the economically and academically
disadvantaged.76 The Black Coaches Association (BCA) derided the lack of
African-American representation in the rule-making body, even though the
rules would disproportionately affect athletes of color; the NCAA could not hide
that its policies implicated the organization in racist practices.77 Proposals to
eliminate standardized test scores were rejected, as were proposals to
redefine partial qualifiers.78 In place of Prop 16, there was a call for using
classroom performance—educators believe it is the best indicator, and
standardized tests have shown to reduce African-American access to college.
However, the NCAA defends its academic legislation, reiterating that the
legislation is not about race but stronger educational values that
African-Americans will eventually rise to.79 But does this simply shift blame
from the NCAA to the athletes while the proportion of whites to blacks

71. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 147 (citing Cureton II, 198 F.3d at 115).
72. Id. at 148.
73. See generally id. at 148–50.
74. See Wilson, supra note 32.
75. Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory
Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 203 (1996) (accusing the NCAA of adopting legislation that
harmed economically disadvantaged and academically at-risk student-athletes and referring to reforms
as “knee-jerk” reactions).
76. See id. at 203–04. As a way to try to draw attention to their issues, the Black Coaches Association
(BCA) threatened to organize a series of protests and boycotts, including coaches and players, in 1993;
the threats never came to fruition after behind-the-scenes negotiations halted the actions, but the BCA
succeeded in raising issues of racial inequality in intercollegiate athletics. Id.
77. See generally id. at 204, 212–26.
78. Id. at 208–09.
79. See id. at 210–11.
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continues to increase?80 The next major lawsuit against the organization set out
to prove the NCAA was guilty of intentional discrimination.
D. Intentional Discrimination: Pryor II and More Policy Changes
Pryor v. NCAA was significant for the changes it would bring to the
NCAA’s academic policies, for once resulting in the loosening of the
academic restrictions.81 For the first time, the organization faced charges of
deliberate and purposeful racially discriminatory practices. Two
African-American plaintiffs contended that Prop 16’s true goal was to “screen
out” and reduce the number of possible athletic scholarships for black students,
violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.82 The
district court dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiffs could not be provided
a remedy for their claim of “deliberate indifference” under Title VI and failed
to adequately allege intentional discrimination under the section 1981 claim.83
However, this holding was later reversed by the Third Circuit, which held that
the plaintiffs had a sufficient claim for purposeful discrimination under Title VI
and section 1981.84 This case set a new precedent with the circuit court’s
affirmation sustaining the long-running argument that NCAA academic policies
established a standard of institutional racism. Pryor II “reopened possibilities
for plaintiffs to sue the NCAA for discrimination.”85 Following the court’s
decision, the NCAA had no choice but to revise its policies once more, this time
relaxing its standards to protect itself from continued racist accusations.
Kelly Pryor and Warren Spivey were two African-American athletes
who each signed a National Letter of Intent to receive athletic scholarships at
Division I institutions.86 However, both failed to meet the conditions of Prop
16, rendering their athletic scholarships void, and in February 2000, filed a
lawsuit against the NCAA for intentional discrimination.87 The plaintiffs
80. See id. at 211–12. “[H]eightening eligibility requirements are viewed as an easy means of
shifting educational responsibility from universities to student-athletes.” Id. at 212.
81. See Pryor v. NCAA (Pryor II), 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002).
82. See id. at 552; Pryor v. NCAA (Pryor I), 153 F. Supp. 2d 710, 711–12 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2016).
83. Pryor I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 716–19; Anneliese Munczinski, Interception! The Courts Get
Another Pass at the NCAA and the Intentional Discrimination of Proposition 16 in Pryor v. NCAA, 10
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 389, 394 (2003).
84. Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 562.
85. Munczinski, supra note 83, at 391. “Although the court did not settle the dispute, the opinion
does suggest that purposeful discrimination suits may succeed against the NCAA in the future.” Id.
86. Id. at 392 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 554–55).
87. Id. at 392–93 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 555). Kelly Pryor, while still in high school, signed a
national letter of intent to play varsity soccer at San Jose State University; Warren Spivey signed to
play football at the University of Connecticut. Id. at 392. However, both had their athletic scholarships
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stated that although the NCAA purported the goal of Prop 16 was to improve
African-American graduation rates, Prop 16 actually increased
African-American athletic ineligibility and decreased the number of
scholarships they received.88 The plaintiffs stated that “the NCAA knew of and
intended these effects.”89 Under Title VI and section 1981, the plaintiffs sought
relief for purposeful discrimination and deliberate indifference.90 The court
reviewed judicial guidelines to determine whether the NCAA’s policy qualified
as intentional discrimination through a “facially neutral policy.”91 Unlike
Cureton I, the plaintiffs could not claim discrimination based solely on a
disproportionate, negative effect on a particular race; they had to prove
intentional imposition of adverse effects on African-American
student-athletes.92 Enough evidence existed to prove that the NCAA did
explicitly consider race while creating and adopting Prop 16.93 “The NCAA
explicitly stated that one of the major goals of Proposition 16 was to increase
the graduation rates of the African-American [student-athletes],”94 and the
plaintiffs provided evidence that the organization relied on research
demonstrating that the increased academic standards of Prop 16 “would ‘screen
out’ [a] number of African-American athletes who would [not] meet [this new]
revoked pursuant to NCAA Prop 16 regulations. See id. at 392–93. Pryor was granted partial qualifier
status due to a learning disability allowing her to practice with the team but not compete. Id. at 393.
Pryor initially sued under the American with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. Id. Spivey joined
with her to bring suit for intentional discrimination under Title VI and § 1981. Id.
88. Id. at 393 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 552). “Pryor and Spivey admitted in their complaint that
the purported goal of Proposition 16 was to improve graduation rates among black student-athletes.
Yet, they asserted that Proposition 16 actually rendered an increased number of African-American
athletes ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics and receive scholarships.” Id.
89. Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 552).
90. Id. at 394 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 557).
91. Id. at 402. “[The] plaintiff[s] must show that the relevant decisionmaker . . . adopted the
policy . . . ‘“because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects’ [on a specific] group.” Pryor II,
288 F.3d at 562 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
92. Compare Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1999), with Munczinski, supra note 83,
at 401–02. Because of Cureton I, the “plaintiffs ha[d] to show that the discrimination was intended,
and not a mere by-product . . . to sustain a claim under § 1981 or Title VI.” Munczinski, supra note
83, at 402. “The mere awareness of the consequences of an otherwise neutral policy will not be
sufficient to provide the basis for a Title VI and § 1981 suit.” Id. Pryor and Spivey would be entitled
to relief if they could show that: (1) they belong to a racial minority group, (2) they are victims of an
intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant, and (3) “discrimination concerning one or
more of the activities enumerated in § 1981” occurred. Id. at 403.
93. Munczinski, supra note 83, at 408 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564). To recover any remedy,
the plaintiffs “had to prove that the NCAA adopted Proposition 16 intentionally to impose adverse
effects upon African-American student-athletes.” Id. (referencing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 562). The Third
Circuit believed there was enough evidence to show that “the NCAA expressly considered race when
it adopted Proposition 16.” Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564).
94. Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564).
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standard.”95 According to the district court, the NCAA adopted Prop 16 in spite
of this negative impact on African-American athletes, not because of the
potential positive.96 The appellate court inferred that the NCAA intended that
Prop 16 would, at least in part, “reduce the number of African-Americans
eligible for athletic scholarships.”97 Although the court did not officially state
that all of the NCAA’s intentions were “sinister” in its decision-making, the
policy purposely discriminated against a group, rendering it void until the
NCAA could provide evidence to the contrary.98 By coming to this decision,
the court held that the plaintiffs had a valid claim for purposeful discrimination;
the second claim for deliberate indifference was unnecessary.99
The NCAA understood the ramifications of such a decision. Faced with
a public that saw it lose a case charging it with intentional racial
discrimination, Prop 16 would have to undergo major renovations to avoid
further claims of discrimination. For the African-American athletic population,
it was a victory. After years of speaking out about racist undertones, and even
overt discriminatory practices, the Pryor II decision gave credence to their
claims. The NCAA’s history of racial discrimination would have to change by
force, unless it wanted to spend years and money fighting cases. Following the
appellate court’s decision, the NCAA amended the sliding scale for initial
eligibility to reflect numbers that were less restrictive and discriminatory.100
Simultaneously, the NCAA had to contend with ensuring that it was putting
education first. The most recent policy change prior to the upcoming 2016 2.3
or Take a Knee policy came in 2003. This reform package purported to
de-emphasize the importance of standardized tests. But, there would still be a
sliding scale that weighed GPA and test scores, and the number of required core
courses would see another increase.101 The NCAA and its ever-present
balancing act, which now required explicit attention to whether its new
practices could be deemed racially discriminatory, still seemed to always fall
short of providing racial equality and opportunity.
95. Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564).
96. Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564.
97. Munczinksi, supra note 83, at 409 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564).
98. Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 566). The court stated that “although it was difficult to imagine
that the NCAA embraced sinister motives, a policy that purposefully discriminates on account of race
is presumed void unless it survives strict scrutiny.” Id. The plaintiffs’ claim would remain until the
NCAA could produce facts that show it did not intend race-based discrimination. Id. (citing Pryor II,
288 F.3d at 566).
99. Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564, 567; see also Munczinski, supra note 83, at 410.
100. Blackman, supra note 33, at 235. “After Pryor II, the NCAA lowered the stringent academic
requirements of Prop. 16 and amended the sliding scale initial eligibility index to be less restrictive and
less discriminatory.” Id.
101. Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, supra note 9, at 1.
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In 2003, eligibility standards were adapted from three alternative
proposals to amend the standards existing at the time.102 The NCAA purported
to have two goals with its adjustments: “maximize academic success and
minimize adverse impact on low-income and minority student-athletes.”103
Among the first changes were the increase in the number of core courses from
thirteen to fourteen and the complete elimination of the partial qualifier
provision.104 The biggest focus, test score cutoffs, was eliminated—an SAT
score as low as 400, or a comparable ACT score, could still be enough to
qualify if the student’s GPA was high enough.105 In 2008, the Division I core
course requirement was increased once again from fourteen to sixteen.106
As the NCAA always seems to remain dormant for so long, and with Pryor
II over a decade behind, the organization began working on its next
policy change that would take effect in 2016. Though not yet implemented, the
newest policy, 2.3 or Take a Knee, is arguably the most academically intensive
change the organization has ever created. And based on inferences from
existing data and NCAA history, it will once again be hard to deny the
disproportionately high and purposely adverse effects the new policy will have
on African-American student-athletes. Though the focus in this policy has
shifted from test scores to GPA, this increase, especially because it focuses on
core courses, will likely result in the most widespread shift in the racial makeup
of the revenue sports in decades. And if the revenue sports, especially
basketball, which has a dominant African-American presence, undergo
substantial whitewashing, the NCAA will be hard-pressed to escape the
impending backlash and evidence that will support its continuation of
institutionally racist practices. Though the upcoming changes were introduced
in 2012, giving all students their full high school careers to prepare, data
supports the conclusion that prospective African-American college freshmen
athletes will still suffer the most.

102. See id. at 6–8.
103. Todd A. Petr & John J. McArdle, Academic Research and Reform: A History of the Empirical
Basis for NCAA Academic Policy, 5 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 27, 33–34 (2012).
104. See Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, supra note 9, at 1.
105. Id.
106. NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., NCAA FRESHMAN-ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS: QUICK REFERENCE
SHEET
1
(May
7,
2008),
http://www.itatennis.com/Assets/ita_assets/pdf/Junior+Players/NCAA_Eligibility_Center_Reference_Sheet.pdf.
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IV. WHAT’S COMING AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
A. A Bleak Future for Black Male Revenue-Sport Student-Athletes
What does this mean for the group of student-athletes that will enter
Division I institutions in the fall of 2016? Though the NCAA has claimed to
work tirelessly over the years to undercut the racial undertones of its academic
policies, what is likely to occur this fall is out of the NCAA’s hands. The new
academic standard should statistically affect more incoming African-American
males than any other population. By raising the minimum
immediate-competition GPA to 2.3, almost half of African-American male
student-athletes will struggle with eligibility. The National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) tracked twenty years of academic progress by gender and
race/ethnicity in its report, “The Nation’s Report Card.”107 The document covers
the time period from 1990 to 2009, breaking down data by cumulative GPA and
core course GPA.108 The NCAA is requiring a 2.3 cumulative GPA for core
courses. As an average, this assumes that about half of the population of interest
would have a GPA below the mean. The 2.38 already straddles the line of
eligibility, leading to the conclusion that African-Americans are at a higher risk
of being deemed ineligible and disproportionately so. When the focus is placed
on the two revenue-producing sports, it becomes much clearer that the new
policy would disqualify black male football and basketball players at a much
larger percentage than any other racial group.
According to the NCAA’s research, 43.1% of men’s basketball players and
35% of football players that enrolled as freshman in the fall of 2009 would have
been ineligible to play if the new standards were in place.109
Academically, not much has changed, as 2015 predictions state that 40% of the
basketball players and 35% of the football players currently in high school are
not going to be eligible under the new rules.110 Scholars researching this area
have been careful to not implicate race, generalizing it by the entire sport. But

107. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP’T EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT
CARD: AMERICA’S HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 22–42 (2009), http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/2011462.pdf.
108. See id. (categorizing by race/ethnicity, gender, and course variations, including core academic
GPA, total cumulative GPA, and average GPA by course type).
109. Dana O’Neil, Eligibility vs. Academic Preparedness, ESPN (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/8236949/ncaa-increases-minimum-eligibility-standardsdivision-student-athletes.
110. See NCAA Eligibility, ABOVE THE RIM RECRUITING, INC., http://abovetherimrecruiting.com/ncaa-eligibility-guidelines/ (last visited June 9, 2016) (providing the most accurate information
available for predictions about the impact the new standards will have on the incoming 2016 class of
college student-athletes).
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it is already general knowledge that African-American males make up a large
percentage of both sports (45.8% in football and 60.9% in basketball).111 What
is more difficult to find is the racial makeup of freshmen
student-athletes. As a whole, this is not published; one would have to
manually count the freshmen on each Division I roster. A smaller version of this
approach was undertaken to further support the negative racial
implications of this new policy. Arguably, the SEC is a powerhouse
conference for football, housing fourteen institutions, while the Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC) is massively popular for basketball and made up of fifteen
institutions. Focusing first on football and the SEC, a review of current rosters
reveals that of the 416 freshmen, 271 of them are African-American, a
staggering 65%. Additionally, many of these freshmen were eligible to play
immediately, and did, as the popularity of the redshirt is declining in the SEC.112
Half of the SEC teams redshirted less than ten of their freshmen
during the 2013–2014 season, and these institutions have over twenty
freshmen on their rosters.113 Experts believe more true freshmen are seeing
playing time because of increases in scholarship limitations, players departing
early for the NFL draft, and young talent.114 In 2013, less than half of the
available freshmen redshirted, leaving 196 of the 348 eligible for play.
Statistical analysis infers that the majority of the available pool were
African-American. That could change dramatically.
If the NCAA’s 2009 numbers hold steady, 35.2% of incoming football
players will be academically ineligible to participate.115 Using the 2015 SEC
football rosters as an example, 146 of the 416 freshmen would be unable to
participate. As previously stated 65% of the 416 freshmen are
African-American. Considered another way, for every twenty players, thirteen
are African-American. Following this data, 95 of the 146 ineligible
student-athletes are African-American student-athletes. This is further
supported by the previous inference about African-American male GPAs.
Football student-athletes already underperform their non-athlete peers,
pushing African-Americans further down the eligibility list when you factor in
their GPAs. What was once the vast majority of the incoming football
111. Bimper, supra note 20.
112. See Chase Goodbread, Redshirting in College Football Trending Downward, NFL (Aug. 25,
2014),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000383458/article/redshirting-in-college-footballtrending-downward.
113. Mike Herndon, Redshirting Diminishes as More Players Leave Early for NFL and Young
Talents Want to Play, AL (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/08/redshirting_diminishes_as_more.html.
114. See id.
115. O’Neil, supra note 109.
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population will drop to the minority because of a GPA increase that blatantly
affects one group more than any other. The implied institutional racism is
further supported by the effects the new policy will have on basketball in the
ACC, which, similar to football, has 65% African-American freshmen
representation at thirty-nine. Redshirting is rarely employed in college
basketball; athletes come prepared to immediately contribute to the team.
However, according to the NCAA, 43.1% of incoming student-athletes will
have to delay their debuts. If this was applied to the class that matriculated most
recently, twenty-six of the sixty freshmen would be disqualified from
competition. Simple statistical analysis predicts that seventeen of those
twenty-six freshmen would likely be African-American. Once again the
population would see a shift. GPA restrictions favor the recruitment of white
student-athletes to fill the void because it will be easier to find white athletes
who will immediately qualify based on the predicted GPA data.
Despite using only the data of two conferences, the implications are
obvious: the new NCAA policy will disproportionately deplete the
African-American presence in the college sports they currently dominate, which
have been producing the most revenue. In the words of Sonny Vaccaro, “Ninety
percent of the NCAA revenue is produced by 1 percent of the athletes. Go to
the skill positions—the stars. Ninety percent (of the 1 percent) are [b]lack.”116
Of the prospective student-athletes who face the reality that they will not meet
NCAA requirements, the majority will be black. In trying to fulfill the NCAA’s
new requirement, coaches will have a much easier time finding white males that
meet the grade requirement, relegating African-Americans to a minority
presence. It begs the question of whether this has been the plan for some time:
let African-American athletes build the sport to a point where it could transcend
their efforts, then gradually push them out. The NCAA is not new to charges of
institutional racism, and with this policy, it will likely have to justify its actions,
especially when the numbers support discriminatory changes.
B. WHAT Can the NCAA Do to Attempt Redemption (Again)?
The NCAA cannot deny the effects the new policy will have on
African-American male athletes. Though the organization makes its academic
data available publicly, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania support
publishing data that delineates the information similar to the framework
above.117 Separating athletic academic data by race, sex, sport, and division will
116. Everett L. Glenn, The Shame of College Sports: Black Athletes Play. But Where’s the Payoff?,
SACRAMENTO OBSERVER (Mar. 11, 2013), http://sacobserver.com/2013/03/the-shame-of-collegesports/.
117. See SHAUN R. HARPER ET AL., BLACK MALE STUDENT-ATHLETES AND RACIAL INEQUITIES
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allow the NCAA to justify any claims it makes about the academic
progress of the population that generates most of its annual revenue.118 These
same researchers suggest a number of additional improvements, such as
establishing “a commission on racial equity that routinely calls for and
responds to” the data, disallowing the NCAA to persist in any behavior that can
qualify as fostering racial inequality.119 Additionally, athletic programs in the
five conferences that generate the most revenue should use some of their
revenues to establish programming and interventions to improve racial
equity.120 Finally, the researchers call for more accountability from the
colleges and their administrations, faculty, and staff.121 The NCAA's academic
policies tend to place all of the academic burdens on the population that is
systematically at a disadvantage, partially due to the organization's own
policies that discriminate against them. College leaders should want to see the
categorized data for analysis and charge themselves with closing racial gaps
observed in the reports.
V.

CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

In its recent history, the NCAA has continuously displayed some level
of upheaval in establishing academic policies, particularly as they pertain to
initial eligibility. In combating critics and holding steadfast to its mission of
championing educational primacy, the organization has unfortunately
ignored—or purposely neglected—the needs of its most significant
participants, the black men on the basketball and football teams. These
student-athletes have a dominant presence in each sport despite academic
policies that work against their favor. Over the last three decades, it has
become impossible to deny the institutional racist practices of the
NCAA—arbitrary cutoff scores and academic requirements that run counter to
the average academic achievement of black male athletes. Furthermore, much
has been written about the not-so-coincidental alignment of more stringent
academic standards with the influx of black college athletes. The NCAA is torn
between its commercial interests and its policymakers, who are oblivious to
their institutional racist policies. As the organization tries to toe the line, it
typically ends up on the wrong side, shutting out a population that benefits
greatly from the ability to use college athletics as a means to obtain access to
NCAA DIVISION I COLLEGE SPORTS 16 (2013), https://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/publications/Harper_Williams_and_Blackman_(2013).pdf.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
IN
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higher education.
Systematic disadvantages have stifled the academic progression of black
male athletes with their average GPAs always trailing behind their white male
counterparts; the same applies to their test scores. Though this information has
always been readily available, the NCAA still established policies that would
reduce the eligibility pool for this population. After being called out by
coaches, standardized test makers, and finally, the athletes themselves, in court,
the NCAA was indirectly acknowledging its history of racial inequity by
removing test score barriers and focusing on other academic requirements. The
sliding scale is not a perfect science either, as data shows that
African-American athletes average lower GPAs. This would require higher test
scores, which they lag in as well. However, the sliding scale and
minimum-score removal did appear to be a step in the right direction. But as
2016 draws closer and frameworks are developed, it is hard to look at the
racial shift that is likely to occur, at least for the first few years, in men’s
basketball and football, and not apply the term “institutional racism.” No other
population will be affected the same way. And if the NCAA learned anything
from the Pryor II case, it is that it cannot purport to not know the potential
positives of the policy and it cannot justify its negative effects. The incoming
freshmen with immediate eligibility will be overwhelmingly white, and while
the young black men try to fulfill the requirements to earn athletic competition
time, the country will have time to adjust to basketball and football without as
many black faces. If this image holds, will African-American males ever be able
to regain their dominance? It appeared that as soon as black male athletes began
pouring in, the policymakers have been working towards slowly, but
systematically, pushing them back out. The 2016 policy has the best chance in
decades of accomplishing this on a large scale.
There is no guarantee that this will happen; however, history and current
data suggest that it will. Furthermore, it will take a number of years to
plateau—assuming it does or that another policy change is not implemented that
further discriminates against African-American athletes. With such
staggering evidence, the NCAA will be hard-pressed to convince anyone who
takes issue with the racist implications of the policy that it was neither the
NCAA’s intention nor something it could not predict; the data speaks for
itself. It is likely that the organization will be forced to amend the policy
sooner than planned or face the ramifications, possibly legal, of its newest
attempt of academic reform.

